The Role of Culture in Warfare

THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN WARFARE

Kenneth L. Hacker

Last updated: March 22, 2009

Culture awareness and knowledge have ancient roots but have become terms of interest for variou sectors of the American military. In this paper, I explore the critical nature of culture to warfare and why increasing cultural competence will help the United States in choosing its battles more carefully and in making those that are fought more effective.

The place of culture in the conduct of war is not a new concern, but rather an ancient one going back to at least the warfare calculations of Alexander the Great. The wisdom of intensive cultural analysis preceding warfare or being part of it, however, may have been diminished in recent years. Alexander, the Macedonian conqueror, did not enter a territory he would conquer without first studying its culture, language, religion, politics, and ways of living. Perhaps this helps to explain why none of his conquered nations rebelled against his empire.

It should not be surprising to learn that the military of the United States is stressing the importance of intercultural communication more than ever. While much of this improvement in communication emphasis is based on what are called “lessons learned,” some of the improvement is also coming from communication analysis from “boots on the ground.” With the employment of communication theory, specific theories from the study of intercultural communication, this focus on the important of culture should get even better.

Culture involves common experiences, values, and norms which guide behavior (Miller, 2001). Cultures provide performance scripts, ways of interpreting experiences, and ways of participating and affirming membership in a community (Miller, 2001). There have been studies on differing communication styles and intercultural interaction between the Israelis and Palestinians, but little work on styles of arguing in the conflict between the two cultures (Ellis & Maoz, 2002). The conflict is extreme, with both sides seeing each other as enemies. Both sides use historically- formed communicative styles. Arabs employ a collectivist ethos oriented toward face saving and harmonious social relations known as musayra (Ellis & Maoz, 2002, p. 182). Israelis have a different pattern known as dugri or straight talk (Ellis & Maoz, 2002, p. 182). Speech patterns converge with agreement and diverge with disagreement. A key point here is that reconciliation-based grassroots dialogues can add a powerful context for ameliorating differences between these two groups (Ellis & Maoz, 2002, p. 191). Moreover, this effect can be amplified when participants are offered non-threatening opportunities for dialogue (Maoz, 2000).

All cultures have people concerned with saving face. There are cultural variations from there. In Chinese culture there are two kinds of face, Lien and mein-tzu, with the former signifying a sense off worth that can be hurt only through severely immoral conduct and the latter vulnerable to simple violations of social expectations (Miller, 2001).

This type of focus on cultural differences in communication is vital to U.S. military personnel being able to have meaningful and productive social interaction with people in other nations. In the absence of cultural intelligence and intercultural communication skills, soldiers and military leaders are likely to commit “mirroring” errors where they fail to recognize that people with cultural backgrounds different than theirs are unlikely to think and feel as they do about certain matters. Cultural intelligence involves an ability to adapt to new or different cultural contexts.

Military Focus on Culture in Iraq

A 2004 report from a section of the Defense Department argues that strategic communication is vital for the conduct of foreign policy operation by the United States. Some military experts believe that enemies will exploit multiple forms of attack rather than single forms and refer to this as “hybrid wars” Mattis & Hoffman (2005, p. 19). They also call for a plan known as the “Four Block War” in whish troops are engaged with heavy combat on one block, handing out humanitarian aid on another, doing mediation work on the third, and engaged in information operations on the fourth Mattis & Hoffman (2005). These experts stress that information operations addresses the fact tha insurgencies involve force but also wars of ideas. They argue that “The information ops component is how we extend our reach and how we can influence populations to reject the misshaped ideology and hatred they are offered by the insurgents Mattis & Hoffman (2005, p. 19). In this view, U.S. Marines are on the ground as both “sensors” who gather intelligence and as “transmitters” who persuade Iraqi civilians that Americans are there to help them build a better future Mattis & Hoffman (2005, p.19).

The situation in Iraq is described by some as involving community sectarianism. Some say it is close to civil while others see it as somehow approaching unity the three most prominent factions – Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds. Of course, there are factions with these three major categories. While civil way may or may not occur, there is continuous polarization of the conflict in political discourse issued by the sectarian voices and political parties (De Atkine, 2006). Knowing what is most likely to occur next, despite inexactitude, and what the United States can do best to save fact and encourage democratic nationalism in Iraq depends on knowing more about the identities of the Iraqi people and how they affect and are affected by political communication.

There are numerous identity issues that are critical for the Iraqi society – national identity, ethnic identity, religious identity, and communal identity (De Atkine, 2006). Sectarian identity can have any of these as its most salient feature (De Atkine, 2006). If a person views their most important (salient) identity as Arab, they may behave differently than if they view their most important identity as Islamic. Some observers believe that many, if not most, people in the Middle East, have multiple personal identities (De Atkine, 2006). More importantly, these multiple identities are not fixed or static. They can change in relative salience by the situations that are encountered. Thus, an Iraqi may see that part of themselves as most important in one situation but in another see their membership in Islam as Sunni or Shi’s as more important that their national (Iraqi) identity (De Atkine, 2006). Interesting historical mistakes by political leaders are traceable to a failure to understand this shifting nature of identities in Iraqi culture. For example, Saddam Hussein thought that Arabs in Iran would side with him in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. At the same time, Iranians thought that Shi’a in Iraq would defect to the Iranian side. Both judgments were wrong and national identities trumped religious ones (De Atkine, 2006).

Culture intelligence needs to include an appreciation of how cultural identities are not only plural but also dynamic. Such intelligence can facilitate more effective communication and persuasion in efforts by Americans to communicate with Iraqis. There are also psychological aspects of culture that are important for cultural understanding and analysis. For example, some Iraqis have revealed that they do not like to look at the destroyed buildings of the destroyed regime of Saddam Hussein because they still think of themselves in terms of national identities and the destroyed buildings provide images of a “defeated people.” (De Atkine, 2006, p. 14). Some felt the same way about Saddam Hussein being captured and examined by a U.S. military medic – something embarrassing for “the president” of their nation, even if he was hated (De Atkine, 2006, p.14).

Cultural Sensitivity and Beyond

Tactical operations by Marines in Iraq can be perceived as harassment by civilians who request their sheik to so something about the problem. U.S. commanders use this context to negotiate cessation of tactical operations in exchange for revealing local insurgents and providing more local security Mattis & Hoffman (2005). Cultural violations can ruin this kind of negotiation context.

Cultural challenges for U.S. military forces include communication with Iraqi civilians, training of Iraqi soldiers and security forces, and communication with prisoners, suspects, and insurgents. The Iraqi army has the same kind of cultural diversity as the population in general (Williamson, 2006). Expectations of U.S. personnel are linked to American culture. This can lead to disappointment by American trainers. In Iraqi culture, the class division between officers and enlisted personnel is stronger than that for Americans, so the latter have to recognize why Iraqi officers will defer to American enlisted advisors in some matters but not in others. In the case where they insist on communication with high-ranking American officers they may be treating the latter as something like tribal chiefs (Williamson, 2006).

Simulating Culture

In Norfolk, Virginia, Marines practice communication in combat circumstances in a village that is staged for urban training (Hansen, 2006). This is cultural immersion training in a simulated environment. Simulation exercises include roadside bomb and hand grenade attacks (Williamson, 2006). Iraqi immigrants are hired to role play parts like sheiks, security forces, and angry villagers (Williamson, 2006). They also teach soldiers how to communicate with religious groups and leaders of families (Williamson, 2006). One lesson is telling the Marines to spend more time interacting with citizens to show caring.

In Twentynine Palms, California, another simulated Iraqi village is being used to train Marines in more effective intercultural communication (Carter, 2006). This is Village 215 and it is used to model what is found in typical Iraqi communities such as banks, police stations, markets, mosques, schools, etc. There are 250 people playing roles, some of them Iraqi-Americans (Carter, 2006). There are actors who play insurgents and these people simulate violence, bombings, and gunfire (Carter, 2006). Village 215 includes lessons in Iraqi customs and culture. Two women brought here from Basra, Iraq, show the Marines how to treat women in Iraq in ways that are least offensive to people in that culture (Carter, 2006).

Communication Technology and Cultural Intelligence

There are various forms of communication technologies that can used for the learning of culture as described above. These include web sites, discussion forums, computer-based simulations (captology), and collaboratoria.

References:

Carter, C. (2006). Training for Iraq: Sometimes it takes a (fake) village. Associate Press, March 6, 2006.

De Atkine, N. (2006). Iraq withdrawal: A tragedy in slow motion. Proceedings, 132, 12-15.

Ellis, D. G, & Maoz, I. (2002). Cross-cultural argument interactions between Israeli-Jews and Palestinians. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 30, 181-194

Finer, J., & Fekeiki, O. (2006). Iraq’s crisis of scarred psyches. Washington Post, March 6, 2006.

Griffin, E. ( 2003). A First Look at Communication Theory. Boston: McGraw Hill.

Hansen, L. (2006). Marine training aims to prepare for Iraqi warfare. The Virginian-Pilot, February 28, 2006.

Johnson-Cartee, K., & Copeland, G. A. (2004). Strategic Political Communication. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Lambert, S. P. (2005). The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research.

Mattis, J. N., & Hoffman, F. (2005). Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Proceedings, 131, 18-19.

Nye, J. S. (2006). Think again: Soft power. Foreign Policy, February 23, 2006. Available: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3393

Williamson, C. L. (2005). On the ragged edge: Standing up the Iraqi army. Proceedings, 132, 52-57.